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Abstract
Objective: Somatic marker theory predicts that somatic cues serve intuitive
decision making; however, cardiovascular symptoms are threat cues for patients
with panic disorder (PD). Therefore, enhanced cardiac perception may aid
intuitive decision making only in healthy individuals, but impair intuitive deci-
sion making in PD patients. Methods: PD patients and age- and sex-matched
volunteers without a psychiatric diagnosis (n = 17, respectively) completed the
Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) as a measure of intuitive decision making. Interin-
dividual differences in cardiac perception were assessed with a common men-
tal-tracking task. Results: In line with our hypothesis, we found a pattern of
opposing associations (Fisher’s Z = 1.78, P = 0.04) of high cardiac perception
with improved IGT-performance in matched control-participants (r = 0.36,
n = 14) but impaired IGT-performance in PD patients (r = 0.38, n = 13).
Conclusion: Interoceptive skills, typically assumed to aid intuitive decision
making, can have the opposite effect in PD patients who experience interocep-
tive cues as threatening, and tend to avoid them. This may explain why PD
patients frequently have problems with decision making in everyday life.
Screening of cardiac perception may help identifying patients who benefit from
specifically tailored interventions.
Introduction
The effects of physical sensations on overt behavior have
been subject to extensive research, often based on the
somatic marker hypothesis (SMH, Damasio et al. 1991;
Bechara et al. 1994; Damasio 1995). The SMH suggests,
for example, that somatic cues guide decision making in
complex situations, which are characterized by little expli-
cit information to base a decision on, and/or time pres-
sure. More specifically, the SMH posits, that responses in
such situations are associated with specific, learned
somatic states (e.g., heart rate, skin conductance, muscle
tone), which were previously evoked by similar decisions.
These “emotional marker” signals are represented in the
anterior insular cortex and embedded in decision-making
processes via ventromedial prefrontal pathways (Damasio
1995).
An established paradigm for the assessment of intuitive
decision-making patterns under time pressure and with
incomplete information is the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT,
Bechara et al. 1994). Implicit learning skills have been
reported to be positively associated with IGT performance
ª 2013 The Authors. Brain and Behavior published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. This is an open access article under the terms of
the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original work is properly cited.
1
(Bechara et al. 1997). The main body of literature has
considered skin conductance response as a proxy for vis-
ceral somatic markers (Dunn et al. 2006), although the
SMH suggests that cardiac cues may play a similar role.
In line with this assumption, interindividual differences in
trait cardiac perception accuracy have been found to
affect emotional bias on speeded reactions in healthy vol-
unteers (Su¨tterlin et al. 2013). Moreover, at least one
study has demonstrated that healthy participants with
particularly high cardiac perception outperform those
with lower accuracy in the IGT (Werner et al. 2009).
The perception and cognitive evaluation of physical
symptoms is considered to play a crucial role in the
development and maintenance of panic disorder (PD).
The psychophysiological model of PD (Ehlers and Marg-
raf 1989) describes a vicious circle of perception of physi-
cal cues and their catastrophizing evaluation, which
increases the probability of panic attacks. While healthy
individuals attribute the experience of physical changes
(e.g., beating heart, shortness of breath, etc.) to a variety
of internal or external stressors, patients with PD habitu-
ally associate such sensations with imminent threat (Clark
et al. 1988; Hofmann et al. 2008).
Increased sensitivity to physical cues (Barsky 1992;
Ehlers and Breuer 1996; Eley et al. 2004; Hoehn-Saric
et al. 2004) and their catastrophizing appraisal are typical
features of PD and are often principal targets for PD
treatment (Hofmann et al. 2008). A large body of
research further supports the role of biased perception
and interpretation of physical symptoms in the develop-
ment (Bouton et al. 2001) and maintenance of PD (Ehlers
1993; Richards et al. 2003). There is evidence for
increased perception of physical symptoms in PD patients
(Domschke et al. 2010). Physical symptom perception is
often part of PD patients’ reported symptomatology
(Zoellner and Craske 1999) with cardiac symptoms such
as heart rate playing a prominent role (Hartl 1995).
In addition to increased symptom perception and its
biased attribution to impending threat, there is also
evidence for intolerance of uncertainty in patients with
PD (Carleton et al. 2012; Mahoney and McEvoy 2012),
reduced risk-taking behavior (Giorgetta et al. 2012),
increased latency in speeded decision making (Kaplan
et al. 2006) and heightened sensitivity to errors (Ludewig
et al. 2003). Yet, whether increased perception of physical
cues would impact upon intuitive decision making in PD
patients remains unclear. Given PD patients’ habitual
catastrophizing interpretation of physical cues, it could be
argued that increased interoceptive awareness is detrimen-
tal for intuitive decision making in patients with PD.
The aim of this study was to examine the effects of
increased perception and processing of somatic markers
on decision-making processes in PD patients. In line with
previous studies (Domschke et al. 2010; Grosche et al.
2011), we expected to find enhanced cardiac perception
in PD patients as compared to matched controls without
psychiatric diagnosis. In control participants we further
hypothesized cardioceptive perception accuracy to be pos-
itively associated with performance in intuitive decision
making. In PD patients, we expected to find the opposite
pattern of results, that is high cardioceptive accuracy to
impair intuitive decision making due to PD patients’ cat-
astrophic interpretation of such cues.
Methods
Sample
The patient sample consisted of 17 inpatients (eight
female patients; M = 41.59 years, SD = 13.30), admitted
to a psychosomatic hospital (Scho¨n Klinik Roseneck,
Hospital of Behavioral Medicine, Prien, Germany). All
patients had a principal diagnosis of PD as assessed by
trained clinical psychologists. Diagnoses were based on
DSM-IV-TR criteria (American Psychiatric Association
2000), and verified by J. W., based on the PD-related
parts of the SKID-I (Wittchen et al. 1997). The control
group comprised of 17 volunteers (eight female volun-
teers; M = 36.53 years; SD = 12.10) without mental dis-
orders, matched for gender and age. As indicated by self-
disclosure, none of the control participants had a psychi-
atric diagnosis or any cardiac and/or neurological disor-
der and, therefore, no related medication. Moreover,
none of the participants had taken benzodiazepines within
2 weeks prior to the experimental assessment. Patients
with an additional diagnosis of somatoform disorder were
excluded, due to the suggested role of abnormal percep-
tion of physical symptoms in this diagnostic category.
Nevertheless, those meeting criteria for secondary anxiety
disorders (social phobia n = 1, 11.76%), generalized anxi-
ety disorder (n = 1, 5.88%), or major depression (n = 16,
94.10%) were included, thus representing a typical sample
of PD patients in clinical practice (Kaufmann and Char-
ney 2000; Brown et al. 2001).
Materials
Equipment
ECG was recorded with the NeXus-10 system (Mind
Media BV/Roermond-Herten, Netherlands) using Eintho-
ven lead I configuration with Ambu Blue Sensor VL
(Ambu GmbH/Bad Nauheim/Germany) electrodes. Data
were sampled at 512 Hz. A freeware IGT application was
run on a personal computer (ASUS, Taipeh, Taiwan)
with Windows XP operating system and presented on a
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15-inch LCD-monitor at 1024 9 768 pixel screen resolu-
tion with ~40 cm head-to-screen distance.
Iowa Gambling Task
The IGT consists of four decks of cards (A, B, C, D).
Drawing cards from deck A or B results in large gains but
high losses, leading to an overall loss. In comparison,
drawing cards from decks C and D results in small gains
but similarly small losses and an overall net profit (see
Table 1 for details). Participants are instructed to draw
100 cards from these decks, with the aim to maximize
their profit. Typically, control participants begin by select-
ing cards more or less randomly, followed by a period of
implicit learning with a preference for the net gain option
and finally explicit knowledge resulting in a clear prefer-
ence for decks C and D.
Mental-tracking task
Following Herbert et al. (2012), the participants were
instructed to quietly count the heartbeats, which they
experienced in the time interval between a start and a
stop signal without any supplementary aids such as taking
their pulse or estimating the expected number of heart-
beats based on the (estimated) elapsed time. This task
was performed for four time intervals with 20, 25, 35,
and 45-sec duration and a 60-sec rest time between the
time intervals. During this procedure, participants were
asked to close their eyes, to sit relaxed, and to breathe
consistently. Start and stop of each interval was indicated
verbally by the experimenter. Particularly in small sam-
ples, randomization often does not produce comparable
distributions of conditions across groups. Hence, the
order of time intervals was not randomized, to increase
procedural comparability between the two groups. Impor-
tantly, the individual participants were not aware of the
fixed order. Instructions were given in written form to
standardize the instruction (Ehlers et al. 1995). We added
an initial warm-up trial to allow sufficient time for the
transition from the instructional phase to the different
mode of processing during interoception. The warm-up
trial was not included in the analysis, as we aimed for an
optimal compromise between keeping the scores compa-
rable with previous reports as much as possible and the
added benefit of reducing task-irrelevant training effects
in a situation unfamiliar for most participants (Su¨tterlin
et al. 2013).1
Self-report data
The German version of the State–Trait Anxiety Inventory
(Laux et al. 1981) was used to assess habitual trait and
state anxiety on two scales comprising 20 items each.
Items are rated from 0 (not at all) to 3 (very much so),
resulting in a scale range of 0–60 for each measure.
Higher scores indicate higher anxiety. Cronbach’s a is
about 0.90 for both scales (Laux et al. 1981). The current
sample achieved a Cronbach’s a of 0.92 for the STAI-
State and 0.96 for the STAI-Trait.
The German 21-item version of the Beck Depression
Inventory (BDI) was used to assess dysphoric mood and
depression. Items are rated on a four-point scale from 0
to 3, resulting in an overall score ranging from 0 to 63.
Higher scores represent more severe symptoms of depres-
sion. Internal consistency is good with Cronbach’s
a = 0.89 (Hautzinger et al. 2006).
Trait anxiety sensitivity was assessed with the German
version of the Anxiety Sensitivity Index (ASI, Peterson
and Plehn 1999). Notably, high scores on the ASI have
Table 1. Characteristics of the Iowa Gambling Task.
Deck A Deck B Deck C Deck D
Gain per draw 100 100 50 50
Batch of possible
losses per draw
{0,0,0,0,0,150,200,250,300,350} {0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1250} {0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,55,55,55,55,55} {0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,250}
Range of net loss
versus gain
per draw
250 to +100 1150 to +100 5 to +50 200 to +50
Probability of
positive net gain
per draw
0.5 0.9 0.5 0.9
Each time a card is drawn from one of the decks, the associated gain is won but counterbalanced by a potential loss that is selected at random
from the respective batch of losses. The net amount per draw results from subtracting the loss from the gain. Furthermore, achieving a positive
net gain only occurs at a certain probability.
1It may be noted that including these data in the analysis did
not affect the results.
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been shown to predict both the frequency of panic attacks
in PD patients and increased cardioceptive accuracy
(Domschke et al. 2010). Cronbach’s a of the ASI has been
reported to exceed at least 0.75 (Peterson and Plehn
1999); the current sample achieved an internal consistency
of 0.95.
Positive and negative affect were assessed with the Ger-
man version of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule
(PANAS, Krohne et al. 1996), assessing positive and nega-
tive affect on separate scales comprising 10 items each.
Items are rated from 1 = “little” to 5 = “most” and each
scale score ranges from zero to 50. Higher scores repre-
sent higher positive/negative affect. Cronbach’s a is 0.85
for both scales (Krohne et al. 1996). The current sample
achieved a Cronbach’s a of 0.79 for the PA subscale and
0.88 for the NA subscale.
In addition, the PD group completed the Panik und
Agoraphobie Skala (PAS, Bandelow 1997), which mea-
sures severity of PD on four scales comprising two items
(panic attacks, agoraphobic avoidance, constraints in daily
life and worry on healthiness), one scale with three items
(anticipatory anxiety), plus one additional item to assess
whether panic attacks are mostly unexpected or related to
feared situations. The PAS overall score ranges from 0 to
52 with a cutoff of 9 indicating slight PD. Psychometric
properties are overall sound with a test–retest reliability
of 0.73, Cronbach’s a of 0.86 and high convergent validity
ranging from 0.58 to 0.76 (Bandelow 1997). Cronbach’s a
for the individual subscales ranged between 0.70 and 0.94
in the current sample.
There are reports on associations between performance
in the mental heartbeat-tracking task and participant’s
gender (Ludwick-Rosenthal and Neufeld 1985) and body
mass index (BMI, Montgomery et al. 1984; Jones et al.
1987), as well as between educational level and IGT per-
formance (Davis et al. 2008). We assessed gender and
educational level as control variables via self-report ques-
tionnaires. BMI was assessed at a medical examination
during admission.
Procedure
The study was carried out in compliance with the Code
of Ethics of the World Medical Association (Declaration
of Helsinki) and was approved by the ethics committee of
the Scho¨n Klinik Roseneck. Participants participated vol-
untarily and received no compensation for taking part in
the study. Signed informed consent was obtained for sub-
jects after the nature of the procedures was explained.
Next, participants completed the questionnaires and sub-
sequently performed the mental-tracking task. After
assessment of cardiocepetive accuracy, the participants
performed the IGT.
Data reduction
First, interbeat intervals were extracted from the raw
ECG using ARTiiFACT (Kaufmann et al. 2011). Next,
for each time interval of 25-, 35-, and 45-sec cardiocep-
tive accuracy was calculated with the formula presented
in Figure 1. The result is an index that ranges from 0
to 1, with 1 indicating perfect accuracy of heartbeat
detection.
Statistical analysis
All data were checked for normal distribution with Kol-
mogorov–Smirnov tests and Lilliefors Significance Cor-
rection. The various group characteristics were compared
using independent sample t-tests. To assess associations
of cardioception with IGT parameters and other vari-
ables, Pearson’s correlations were computed. Group dif-
ferences in cardioceptive accuracy and IGT were
compared with independent samples t-test. Fisher’s Z test
for independent samples was used to compare correla-
tions between cardioceptive accuracy and IGT perfor-
mance in both groups.
A priori sensitivity analysis (G*Power 3.1) resulted in a
critical r = 0.48 to achieve test power of 0.80 (a = 0.05)
in two-tailed bivariate testing given the available sample
size. Varying group sizes in single tests may occur due to
missing items in self-report data.
Results
Sample characteristics
Patients with PD did not differ from matched controls
in terms of age, BMI, educational level, and state and
trait anxiety. Significant differences between groups,
however, occurred for positive and negative affect,
depression, and anxiety sensitivity (see Table 2 for
details). Depression and anxiety sensitivity did not
correlate with other variables in both groups. Both
groups consisted of nine male and eight female partici-
pants, their educational level was high. Of these, 58.8%
of PD patients and 58.9% of control participants
reached a higher education entrance qualification. Both
groups were comparable with regard to physical
activity.
Figure 1. Formula for computing the cardioceptive accuracy index
across three time intervals (Werner et al. 2009).
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Cardioceptive perception
In contrast to our expectations there were no significant
group differences in scores of cardiac perception
(t(28) = 0.85, P = 0.20, d = 0.31). PD patients showed a
tendency for lower accuracy (M = 0.61, SD = 0.20) as
compared to matched controls (M = 0.68, SD = 0.22).
IGT performance
On average, PD patients chose a successful card in
46.79 trials out of 100 trials (SD = 8.61, min = 29,
max = 64), as compared to the matched controls, select-
ing winning cards in 48.31 trials out of 100 trials
(SD = 11.88, min = 24, max = 65). More precisely, the
PD group chose deck B most of the time followed by
decks D, A, and C. The control group chose deck B
most often, followed by decks D, C, and A. For details
see Table 3. Nevertheless, in contrast to previous stud-
ies, participants did not switch their strategy after an
initial period from exploration of all decks to selective
preference of decks with a positive yield (C and D), but
continued switching decks unpredictably throughout the
experiment.
Associations between cardioceptive skill
and IGT performance
In line with our hypothesis, the correlations between car-
dioceptive accuracy and IGT performance differed signifi-
cantly between groups (Fisher’s Z = 1.78, P = 0.04).
When tested against zero, there was a positive but not
significant correlation between cardioceptive accuracy
score and positive deck selection in the control group
(r = 0.36, n = 14, P = 0.10; see Figure 2), and an almost
equally strong negative correlation in the PD group
(r = 0.38, n = 13, P = 0.10; see Figure 3), suggesting
Table 2. Means (M), standard deviations (SD), or frequencies (n) and percent (%) significance level (P) and effect size (Cohen’s d, calculated on
basis of control group’s standard deviation) of group characteristics for patients with panic disorder (PD) versus matched controls.
PD patients Matched controls
M or n (SD or %) M or n (SD or %) Test statistic P Effect size
Age 41.59 (13.26) 36.53 (12.61) t(32) = 1.14 0.263 d = 0.40
BMI (kg/m2) 24.58 (2.69) 23.70 (3.06) t(31) = 0.87 0.383 d = 0.29
Educational level1
Hauptschule (2) 2 11.76 2 11.76 V(df) = 0.09 0.966 U = 0.09
Realschule (2) 5 29.41 5 29.41
(Fach-)Abitur (3) 3 17.65 2 11.76
Hochschulabschluss (5) 7 41.18 8 47.06
Participants practicing
any kind of sports (in
all cases this included
endurance training)
12 70.59 14 82.35 Fisher’s exact test P > 0.069 –
Frequency of training
per week
2.67 .88 2.71 1.33 t(24) = 0.11 0.92 d = 0.04
Duration of training per week 1 h 32 min 2 h 21 min 4 h 24 min 7 h 9 min t(24) = 0.11 0.92 d = 0.04
STAI-state 47.19 (3.71) 49.88 (3.26) t(31) = 2.22 0.034* d = 0.83
STAI-trait 47.41 (2.92) 49.59 (2.94) t(32) = 2.17 0.038* d = 0.74
Positive affect 22.47 (5.03) 30.59 (2.91) t(32) = 5.76 <0.001*** d = 1.98
Negative affect 19.06 (6.92) 10.88 (0.93) t(32) = 0.83 <0.001*** d = 1.66
BDI 34.43 (7.92) 3.40 (3.60) t(27) = 13.74 <0.001*** d = 8.62
ASI 35.47 (12.90) 9.94 (6.40) t(32) = 7.31 <0.001*** d = 3.99
BMI, body mass index (kg/m2); STAI, state trait anxiety inventory; ASI, anxiety sensitivity index; Hauptschule, Realschule, and (Fach-)Abitur can be
considered different levels of high school degrees (in ascending order).
1
In parentheses: international standard classification of education (ISCE) according to the UNESCO guidelines from 2011. *P < 0.05,
***P < 0.001.
Table 3. Means (M), standard deviations (SD), minimum (Min), and
maximum (Max) of cards drawn from the four decks (A, B, C, D) for
the panic disorder (PD) patient group as compared to matched
controls.
PD patients Matched controls
Deck M SD Min Max M SD Min Max
A 23.71 6.30 12 33 16.44 10.10 3 41
B 29.50 10.80 11 53 35.25 11.70 16 53
C 20.57 5.80 9 29 20.31 11.60 6 37
D 26.21 7.60 15 40 28.00 14.50 5 56
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that PD patients with high-cardioceptive accuracy selected
advantageous decks less often.
Cardioceptive accuracy did not correlate significantly
with depression (r = 0.45, n = 12, P = 0.14), state anxi-
ety (r = 0.27, n = 14, P = 0.36) or trait anxiety in the
PD group (r = 0.01, n = 15, P = 0.97) or the control
group (depression: r = 0.37, n = 13, P = 0.21; state anxi-
ety: r = 0.37, n = 15, P = 0.18; trait anxiety: r = 0.01,
n = 15, P = 0.97).
Discussion
In this study, we investigated whether cardioceptive
accuracy in patients with PD predicts performance in a
complex decision task, requiring implicit and explicit
learning (i.e., the IGT). In line with predictions derived
from somatic marker theory (Damasio et al. 1991), we
expected that utilization of interoceptive cues aids intui-
tive decision-making in age and sex-matched control par-
ticipants without psychiatric diagnosis. However, in PD
patients we expected the opposite, because interoceptive
information, in particular when related to cardiac symp-
toms, comprises a major source of threat to them, some-
times triggering panic attacks (Ehlers and Margraf 1989;
Hofmann et al. 2008). Therefore, rather than utilizing
interoceptive – in particular cardioceptive information,
we assumed that PD patients may rather try to avoid it,
hence being distracted rather than guided by
somatic cues. Therefore, we expected that high-cardiac
perception, would rather impair decision making, and
hence, IGT performance in PD patients. In line with our
hypothesis, we found significantly different and opposing
patterns of association between cardioceptive accuracy2
and IGT performance in patients with PD and matched
controls.
Control participants tended to benefit from increased
cardioceptive accuracy in terms of better IGT perfor-
mance. First, this replicates evidence for an association
between enhanced cardiac perception and intuitive deci-
sion making (Werner et al. 2009). Second, this is in line
with a study indicating that enhanced cardiac perception
is associated with avoidance of seemingly risky choices in
a framing task, where trials with objectively equal options
were framed emotionally by suggesting that one would
either have the chance to win or face the risk to lose an
equal amount of money in a given trial (Su¨tterlin et al.
2013).
This is the first study to show that cardiac perception
can also have the opposite effect: In PD patients, the asso-
ciation of high-cardiac perception with IGT-task perfor-
mance was significantly different. High cardiac perception
rather impaired than supported intuitive decisions in the
IGT. This result suggests qualitative differences between
control participants and PD patients in the processing of
interoceptive information.
It could be argued that enhanced cardiac perception
may feed into dysfunctional cognitive appraisal. This can
be well integrated into classical vicious-circle models of
PD (Ehlers and Margraf 1989). According to these mod-
els, perception of symptoms leads to catastrophic inter-
pretations, thus increasing autonomic arousal and
physical symptoms that can be perceived as threatening.
Avoidance of associated eliciting cues then leads to
Figure 2. Scatter plot for correlations of cardioceptive skill with IGT
performance in the group of PD patients, including linear regression
line plus lines for margins of one standard deviation.
Figure 3. Scatter plot for correlations of cardioceptive skill with IGT
performance in the control group, including linear regression line plus
lines for margins of one standard deviation.
2Please note the current discussion on related terminology and
what exactly is assessed with the mental-tracking task (Ceunen
et al. 2013).
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generalization and maintenance of PD. In complex deci-
sion-making tasks this may have detrimental effects, when
attention to associated information is withdrawn due to
generalized avoidance of somatic cues as described in the
SMH.
Future studies should examine real-life decision making
in PD patients based on such models. This could well
lead to better explanations why PD patients’ history is
often characterized by decision difficulties (Ludewig et al.
2003; Lorian and Mahoney 2012).
Although the group difference was not significant, con-
trols exercised about twice as long per week as panic
patients. Although cardiac perception was similar in both
groups and the correlations with decision making were
not stronger in the control group, this indicates that
panic patients may be less familiar with experiencing car-
diac symptoms in a safe context. In patients with high
cardiac perception, this may further add to the presumed
detrimental effect of experiencing cardiac somatic cues on
decision making. From a clinical point of view, it may
therefore be interesting to address such a potential associ-
ation of (cardiac) somatic cues with panic-related (nega-
tive) associations. Symptom-focused exposure (e.g.,
elicited by physiological provocation tasks and discrimi-
nation learning) could help to weaken these associations.
Once cardiac symptoms are not experienced as threaten-
ing anymore, this may also withdraw the basis for the
side effects of (cardiac) somatic markers on decision mak-
ing as delineated above. Screening for cardiac perception
may help identify patients who may profit from such an
approach.
Limitations
First, it should be noted, that almost no patient reached
the stage of explicitly understanding the effects of select-
ing a particular deck in the IGT. Therefore, our findings
only apply to the stage where participants decide ran-
domly or rely on a hunch. However, it is clear from
somatic marker theory that this is the stage where cardio-
ception would be considered to have the largest impact
on behavior. Second, we did not find a main effect of
group. This is at odds with previous studies suggesting
that PD patients may generally have higher cardiac per-
ception (for a review see, Domschke et al. 2010). How-
ever, not all previous studies have found this difference,
and the small to medium effect size in our study could
become significant in a larger sample. Comparing these
studies, it is interesting that both participants recruited
from inpatient versus outpatient settings occur. Maybe
differences in symptom severity, comorbidity, treatment
intensity, time since diagnosis, etc. contribute to a larger
heterogeneity in our patient group, reducing effect size
due to error variance. Future studies should therefore pay
particular attention to such moderating factors. Third, it
has been suggested that the mental-tracking task may
reflect cognitive ability rather than interoceptive skill.
Although the present task was designed to prevent the
respective strategy of estimating the time passed during
counting of heartbeats, we cannot completely rule out
that cognitive ability is confounded with cardiac percep-
tion scores. Nevertheless, the reverse association of high-
cardiac perception and decision-making performance
found in panic patients would still be at odds with this
alternative explanation. Moreover, it appears quite hard
to find a plausible explanation why high-cognitive skill
may predict impaired decision making. Hence, we con-
sider our interpretation as the more parsimonious one.
Fourth, the small sample size limits the generalizability of
our results, therefore, warranting future replications in
larger samples. An independent replication of these results
with a larger sample size and consequently more hetero-
geneous sample (e.g., including typical comorbidities)
could increase the generalizability of our conclusions.
Nevertheless, several observations support the reliability
of the current results. First, the correlations are similar to
previously published results on interoceptive accuracy and
anxiety (Pollatos et al. 2007; Domschke et al. 2010) or
those achieved with a similar task (Su¨tterlin et al. 2013).
Second, the sample was homogeneous and carefully
selected to minimize effects of comorbidity and medica-
tion, and third the results do not depend on outliers, sin-
gle participants or small groups of individuals (see
Figs. 2, 3). Fifth, the test situation in the laboratory may
have induced moderate stress in all participants. This may
have induced particular attention to or salience of cardiac
cues in some PD patients. On the other hand, a similarly
stressful context is present in many real-life situations
requiring decision making, hence, this could also be seen
as a factor increasing the ecological validity of this study,
improving generalizability of these findings to real-life
situations.
Conclusion
This is the first study to demonstrate a detrimental effect
of enhanced cardiac perception on intuitive decision mak-
ing in PD patients. These findings extend previous results
indicating that PD patient experience heightened aware-
ness and dysfunctional cognitive processing of somatosen-
sory cues, particularly cardiac activity (Hofmann et al.
2008) and associated bias (Amrhein et al. 2005). Together
with cognitive models comprising of a vicious circle
involving vigilance-anxiety-avoidance (Clark et al. 1988),
our findings provide new insight into the basis for detri-
mental decision making in PD patients.
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